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1. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholders and managers of a modern firm have differing interests. It is difficult 
for shareholders to perfectly perceive investment opportunities and managers’ 
actions (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Actions taken by managers – though not easily 
observable by shareholders - may have a significant impact on shareholders’ wealth 
(Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b). Therefore, it should be a goal for shareholders to 
improve monitoring, motivate their managers and give them incentives to execute 
their actions wisely. Predicted by agency theory, shareholders should design 
compensation contracts for their managers, whereby shareholders’ wealth can also 
increase if the expected costs associated to managerial actions are less than the 
expected returns.  
One possible way to induce executives to operate in the best interest of their 
shareholders is to link managerial compensation to company performance. This 
would tie managerial welfare to shareholder wealth.1 Holding options on the 
company’s stock is one method of correlating a manager’s compensation with 
shareholder returns (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). According to Antle and Smith 
(1986), this method can help align the objectives of managers with shareholders. If a 
manager is risk averse, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) point out that the usefulness 
of such an act depends on the effect of external industry shocks to a company’s 
performance. 
Basing a manager’s pay only on his individual performance gives him incentives 
to be productive. However, his individual observed and measured performance (and 
thus his compensation) is affected by industry shocks (i.e. random factors, which are 
beyond his control). If these common industry shocks are correlated across various 
companies in an industry, it might be a good instrument to let the manager’s 
compensation depend on the performance of his company relative to the 
performance of other companies in the specific industry. This approach is commonly 
known as relative performance evaluation (RPE). When evaluating different types of 
managerial compensation, the RPE hypothesis indicates that companies should 
                                            
1 As pointed out by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), there are other ways to induce managers to act in the 
interest of shareholders: for example competitive labor markets or the threat of dismissal and takeover. 
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compare the firm’s own performance to that of a relevant peer group (Holmström, 
1982). Random industry factors that have an influence on a manager’s performance 
often affect the observed performance of other managers in the same company, 
industry or market as well (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). By allocating a positive 
weight to the performance of the company of interest and negative weights to the 
performance of other firms within the industry, the common industry shock is filtered 
out. This typical procedure for an RPE contract implies that an executive’s pay 
decreases if managers of other companies in the industry distribute higher returns to 
their shareholders (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b). 
Performance-based compensation plans for inducing executives to choose 
actions that increase shareholder wealth have come under scrutiny since the onset of 
the global economic crisis (Bernard and Courtois, 2012). The careful calculation of 
remuneration is now on the agenda of many shareholder meetings. However, 
absolute increases in CEO pay are not the largest problem, with the design of CEO 
contracts also being crucial (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a).  
There has always been a strong link between times of economic crisis and 
increased regulation on executive pay. As a result of the recent financial crisis, 
governments around the world are proposing laws to regulate the remuneration of 
financial executives. The aim of those proposals is to better align remuneration 
practices with shareholders’ interests and promoting the stability of companies and 
the financial system (Core and Guay, 2010). 
From 2009 onwards, federal proposals related not only to executive 
compensation, but also to shareholder empowerment (Hill, 2011). In 2002, the UK 
proposed a mandatory say-on-pay vote within all publicly traded companies, i.e. 
shareholders can cast a non-binding annual vote on the chief executive’s 
compensation package. In other words, companies are able to receive feedback on 
their remuneration structure but are not forced to act upon the proposed changes by 
shareholders. Other countries in the European Union followed, and in 2010, 
President Obama finally signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, letting investors in the US have a say on their executives’ pay. 
Shareholder voting rights might not be a “one-size-fits-all” answer, but it does place 
some degree of pressure on companies and on boards of directors or compensation 
committees to look more carefully at executive remuneration packages. Countries 
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such as Canada, where firms permit their shareholders to conduct voluntary say-on-
pay votes (as there has been until now no governmental requirement for such 
voting), report mostly positive feedback on improved cooperation between 
shareholders and executives. In Switzerland, however, there has been an emerging 
debate regarding say-on-pay. A proposed referendum should determine whether a 
say-on-pay vote will be binding for all Swiss publicly traded companies, with a 
national vote expected to occur at the end of 2012 or at the beginning of 2013. A 
result whereby the majority of voters are in favor of say-on-pay voting would result in 
Switzerland adopting one of the most extreme forms of shareholder voting rights. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of agency theory, 
managerial incentive problems and moral hazard. Chapter 3 illustrates the structure 
of executive compensation contracts. In addition, the associated benefits and 
disadvantages of performance-based remuneration packages are presented. 
Chapter 4 discusses the implications of the global financial crisis on executive 
compensation and the introduction of shareholder voting rights. A classification of 
different approaches of say-on-pay votes as well as consequences for companies in 
the UK, the US and Switzerland are presented. Chapter 5 concludes and gives a 
short outlook on future investigations. 
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2. MANAGERIAL POWER AND AGENCY COSTS 
2.1. Agency theory 
Various agents play a role in agency theory: managers, shareholders, the board 
of directors, and other stakeholders such as the government, suppliers, and 
customers. Each player has a very specific interest to pursue that might involves a 
cost. Agency theory takes place in all organizations and at every level of 
management within the organization. As the information asymmetry between the 
manager and the shareholder of a firm is considered to be the classic example of the 
principal-agent problem, the following discussion focuses on this concept. 
In the beginning of the last century, corporate executives had substantial power 
and almost complete discretion in management (Berle and Means, 1932). The term 
“agency problem” first arose in the 1970s, at a time when research focused on the 
theory of interaction between managers and shareholders and its impacts on 
stakeholders. The term refers to the problem of different interests of managers and 
shareholders, describing the conflicts, which can arise from this relationship (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Since then, the problem of managerial power and discretion 
has been analyzed in modern finance. 
An agency problem arises when a principal who owns a firm engages an agent 
(i.e. a manager) to perform some services on the owner’s behalf. Therefore, the 
owner of the company has to delegate some decision-making authority to the agent, 
i.e. he assigns the control of ownership to the agent (Müller, 2011). The act of 
delegating does not constitute a problem by itself, however managers and owners 
often try to fulfill their own interests and maximize personal welfare (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, maximizing firm value may be in the best interest of the 
principal, but not the main objective for agents. Typically, a principal-agent problem 
involves two different types of risk exposure: principals are risk-neutral, whereas 
agents are rick averse. Principals can diversify their risk by holding a number of 
different firms in their portfolios, whereas an agent only has one profession (Müller, 
2011). The principal-agent problem takes place because of informational asymmetry. 
If one of the parties is utility maximizing, he will not act in the best interest of the 
other and therefore he does not have an incentive to represent the other’s interest. 
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Therefore it is not possible for the owner to ensure that that the agent only takes 
actions, which are in the principal’s interest, without being exposed to agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).2  
In order to ensure that managers create value not only for themselves, but also 
for shareholders, two basic approaches are known for overcoming the so-called 
“agency problem”: (1) monitoring or controlling the agent and (2) managerial 
incentive compensation. While the board of directors usually acts as a “monitor” of a 
company’s management on behalf of its shareholders, incentive compensation tries 
to encourage the manager to maximize the value of the firm and of its shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Generally, shareholders of a large company are too diffuse and uninformed to 
directly control management efficiently. Therefore, shareholders are seen as a 
relatively powerless group providing capital to the company. Although the board of 
directors tries to monitor the relatively small group of management that uses the 
capital on behalf of a typically large group of shareholders, in practice the board of 
directors acts solely as a proxy of shareholders and their provided capital. Thus, the 
board may not act with the same efficacy in regards to shareholder capital as a 
capital owner may do. As a result, even the best board of directors may sometimes 
fail to control management and their behavior. Boards are therefore often criticized 
for not being able to monitor existing management as efficiently as shareholders wish 
them to in order to maximize firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, 
monitoring may be very costly for the principal, as the manager typically has a more 
efficient mechanism to serve as a perfect monitor (Müller, 2011). 
Aware of the above-described problem of monitoring or controlling, the second 
approach, managerial incentive compensation, seems to overcome the first approach 
and directly measures a manager’s success by linking the manager’s remuneration 
to a company’s performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
                                            
2 The costs related to this issue are referred as monitoring costs (imposed to the principal) or bonding costs (by 
the agent) (Müller, 2011). 
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2.2. The moral hazard problem 
Generally, moral hazard is related to asymmetry of information among 
individuals. Within a modern firm, the relationship between shareholders and 
managers is often characterized by this problem. Moral hazard is the consequence of 
not being able to observe individual actions. Therefore, the principal of the company 
cannot include unobservable managerial actions in the CEO compensation contract 
and shareholder monitoring of managerial actions would seem to be the best solution 
to this problem. However, it is possible that the costs resulting from managerial 
monitoring rise significantly or that monitoring is impossible due to complex situations 
within a company. In such cases, the imperfect estimation of managers’ actions is 
often used in practice to reduce moral hazard (Holmström, 1979). 
Due to absence of the role of information in previous economic theory, the 
development of an economic theory based on the absence of a world of perfect 
information (known as the informativeness principle) was necessary. The incentive 
problem originates from an asymmetry of information among individuals. A possible 
solution is to monitor managerial actions and include the information, i.e. informative 
signals, which are provided through any measure of performance in the 
compensation contract of executives (Celentani and Loveira, 2004, Holmström, 
1979). It is important for shareholders to reveal the information about the manager’s 
choice of actions, as they are unobservable to the principal. This problem can be 
analyzed in a single-agent or in a multiple-agent setting. 
The behavior of a party is influenced by whether the party is fully exposed to the 
risks following their actions or not. It is obvious that parties that do not bear the 
consequences of their actions take on more risk than others. This dilemma is referred 
to as the ‘moral hazard problem’ in scientific literature. Using the example of an 
organization, one can see that the moral hazard problem lies in the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Within a multiple-agent setting, moral hazard is 
seen as the problem where agents, having more information than the principal, 
behave differently when their actions cannot be perfectly monitored (Holmström, 
1982). 
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Relative performance evaluation as a means of resolving the moral hazard 
problem can provide two essential features of multi-agent organizations: the free-
rider problem and competition.3 
 
Under certainty, a model of team production where the agents do not behave 
cooperatively can be assumed. The full joint output should be distributed fairly 
between the agents. The non-cooperative game should yield a Nash equilibrium, 
which is in conflict with the budget-balancing restriction.4 Therefore no sharing rules 
can be created which satisfy both agents. This in turn means that improper actions of 
agents do not lead to a fair proportion of the output and that the behavior of all 
agents always leads to an inefficient outcome. Since all agents cannot be penalized 
equally and sufficiently, there exists an incentive for an agent to deviate from optimal 
effort5. To assure the sufficient effort of all agents, shareholders should focus on 
monitoring their behavior (Holmström, 1982, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
From another perspective, the problem of free-riding is due to the inability of 
observing managerial actions and simultaneously imposing budget-balancing 
constraints. When relaxing the budget-balancing assumption, an efficient Nash 
equilibrium exists. One possibility of changing the budget-balancing condition is to 
use group bonus systems and enable penalties to influence the behavior of all 
agents. Only if the group outcome is larger than the efficient Nash equilibrium will a 
bonus be rewarded, otherwise penalties will be permitted. In order to monitor the 
agents in a correct way, a principal who does not provide any inputs has to be hired 
by the firm to administer incentive systems otherwise the free-rider problem 
continues. The introduction of group bonuses and penalties motivates the agents to 
achieve the goals set by the bonus system since they do not have any information if 
the other parties have not put enough effort into their work (Holmström, 1982). 
                                            
3 The term “free-riders” refers to agents who get more than their fair share of output if the combined output is the 
only observable parameter; in other words, one agent may put less effort and time in his work and still get the 
same part of the amount produced. 
4 A Nash equilibrium is named after the mathematician John Nash and is a set of strategies, where neither player 
has an incentive to change unilaterally his strategy. 
5 For example, in small organizations or partnerships, the free-rider problem induces agents to put less effort into 
their work. 
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Given that agents operate under uncertainty, group penalties will work as well 
under the condition that a penalty is created, which reduces each agent’s output if a 
specific, critical output level is not achieved. Concluding this discussion, one can 
state that by introducing bonus or penalty systems, efficient team production will be 
reached (Holmström, 1982). 
These theorems provide evidence for the fact that companies create schemes to 
decompose joint output into the single contributions of agents. The total output is 
assumed as a sum over all individual outputs created by agents, which are 
dependent on their single actions and external effects. If these externalities are 
independent on each other, the optimal sharing rule of each agent only depends on 
the agent’s output. However, if they are dependent, the sharing rule of each agent 
should depend on the output of all agents. In other words, the agents compete with 
each other and are evaluated on the basis of their relative performance (Holmström, 
1982). 
In order to make individual uncertainty independent from total output, measures 
like weighted average of peer performance are necessary, since they screen all 
information about common uncertainty. The optimal sharing rules are only dependent 
on the weighted average and the individual output. With this method one can easily 
filter out the effect of common uncertainties, so that the single agent is only 
responsible for his individual uncertainty and output. This theorem provides a good 
reason for comparing the performance of single agents against peer averages. In 
other words, it is a good idea to link compensation of agents to the company’s 
performance in relation to other companies in the same industry. Such a practice 
became popular in 1980s (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990, Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).6  
For validity of this model the assumption of shareholders knowing managerial 
utility functions and outcome distributions of each of the agent’s actions is necessary, 
which is not likely to occur in the real world. Moreover, basing CEO compensation 
not only on variables that increase shareholder wealth, but also on those that reveal 
some information about managerial actions, creates the danger of providing 
incentives to the manager to put effort into actions that do not increase shareholder 
                                            
6 Especially the decrease of stock options (as they lost their tax advantage) made relative performance measures 
popular (Holmström, 1982).  
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wealth and firm performance. In contrast, this may create incentives to disregard 
projects with large net present values in order to devote effort to those projects that 
are less valuable but provide more information for shareholders (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1990, Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). 
 
2.3. Incentive effects of executive compensation 
If shareholders do not have perfect information about their agents, they may 
pursue different interests. Agents know their own talents and adjust their effort levels 
accordingly. Furthermore, shareholders try to maximize profits, however they do not 
have information on agents’ abilities. Firm output depends only on the work levels 
and not on the abilities of agents (Mirrless, 1976). 
Agents choose their working level in order to maximize their utility function, which 
depends on their payment schedule, work and talents. Any changes in the payment 
schedule changes the chosen work level and thus the outcome of the company. 
Generally, the firm can only employ and retain agents if they at least pay wages to 
reach to fulfill a certain utility level of the agents. This certain utility level is the one 
available to the agents at other firms, i.e. if the firm pays less, agents will leave the 
firm for another company. Each agent is on a pay schedule that is equal to the 
marginal product an agent produces in equilibrium7. In the case of a given labor 
force, under the condition that the payment schedule of a worker is equal to its 
marginal product, the utility function of that worker will be greater or equal to the 
average utility function of all competitors in the market. Thus, the wage for an agent 
will be less than or equal to marginal product. Generally, paying an agent more than 
his marginal product only occurs if there are special circumstances (Mirrless, 1976).  
Under competitive conditions and with equal production schemes among all 
firms, equilibrium can be reached if the payment schedule is equal to the marginal 
product of an agent. If a firm pays an agent more than his marginal product, the firm 
can maximize its profits by paying less and risking losing that agent, given that the 
                                            
7 If the company pays the worker more than he produces, the worker is not valuable for the company. In contrary, 
if the company pays the worker less than he produces, the worker will no longer work with the company, as his 
utility function is higher with another firm. 
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change in work level does not lead to a great change in marginal productivity 
(Mirrless, 1976).  
In an imperfect labor market it is important to take incentive and disincentive 
effects into account when determining pay structures. The difference between the 
wage and the marginal product of a highly skilled agent should be much larger than 
that for an unskilled agent. As the labor market demand becomes more inelastic for 
higher skilled agents, firms can pay less than the marginal product produced by the 
agent (Mirrless, 1976). 
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3. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR CEOS 
3.1. Structure of executive remuneration contracts 
In general, compensation contracts for executives should comprise those 
elements which accomplish the following issues: attract and retain the right 
managers at low costs, encourage them to leave the company if the time is 
appropriate and finally encourage them to take the effort to increase firm value and 
avoid taking actions which destroy shareholder value (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). 
Furthermore, there are three dimensions, which should be taken into 
consideration for designing compensation contracts: total benefits of the job, the 
structure of compensation packages and the pay-performance relation. All three 
dimensions should be managed by directors of a company or a specific 
compensation committee, ordered by the board of directors (Jensen and Murphy, 
2004). 
The remuneration package of top executive managers is usually made up of four 
elements: base salary, short-term compensation (including annual bonuses), long-
term incentives and options. Further components of a CEO’s pay package may 
include retirement plans or restricted stock. 
3.1.1. Base salary 
Until the 2000s, cash remuneration represented the main and substantial part of 
CEOs’ remuneration. One has to bear in mind that industry and market peers play an 
important role in the design of base salary contracts of executives as the competition 
within the same sector often acts a guideline, especially for new firms. Comparisons 
with other firms within the industry are normally adjusted for company size, 
highlighting the link between CEO remuneration and firm size. This sort of 
determining base salaries of CEOs is known as “competitive benchmarking” in 
financial literature (Pope and Young, 2004). The authors also state that CEO salaries 
do not normally take into account dimensions such as age, experience, education, 
performance or job complexity. 
  
12  
3.1.2. Short-term compensation and annual bonuses 
The annual bonus component of a manager’s remuneration is typically tied to a 
company’s performance, with a one-year time period often taken as a reference 
point. According to the associated literature, bonus plans can be categorized in terms 
of three basic components: performance measures, performance standards or 
targets, as well as pay-performance structures (Jensen and Murphy, 2004).8  
Researchers in the field of Finance stress that the use of accounting numbers as 
a basis for calculating the annual bonus is advisable as they are widely used, often 
verifiable and are understandable to outsiders. Moreover, managers precisely know 
how their actions will affect year-end profits and they are provided with the 
information on how they can boost shareholder value. Therefore, managers know the 
value drivers and creators in their organizations, thus having better incentives to 
conduct their day-to-day projects with more effort and motivation (Jensen and 
Murphy, 2004). However, there are also some drawbacks to this method, which have 
consequences for measuring company performance. First of all, accounting numbers 
are always backward looking, which implies that managers do everything to “look 
best” in the past, but would not show that much effort for future projects. Secondly, 
accounting data may be subject to manipulation. Research in executive 
compensation shows that CEOs are deploying creative accounting techniques to 
maximize the value of their bonuses over time and engage in unethical behavior 
(Jensen and Murphy, 2004). 
The most commonly used payout schedule and traditional bonus plan is known 
as the ’80/120 bonus plan’, whereby bonuses will be paid out only if the manager 
reaches a target range of 80%-120%.9 Under this ‘typical’ bonus plan no bonus will 
be paid unless a certain percentage of the target performance is achieved (i.e. 80%) 
and the bonus will be capped at a certain percentage again (i.e. 120%). The 
incentive zone labels the interval of performance where bonuses are paid and an 
incremental raise in performance signifies an incremental raise in bonuses. This 
bonus plan is commonly and widely used among smaller and also larger companies 
as it provides an incentive zone for managers to reach. The benefit of such a plan is 
                                            
8 See Appendix – Figure I for an illustration of the basic components for a typical bonus plan. 
9 The chart in Appendix – Figure I illustrates a typical 80/120 bonus plan. 
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that pay-performance relation can be seen and measured easily. Managers are also 
encouraged to work hard and efficiently in order to receive the annual bonus. 
However, despite the mentioned gains such bonus plans may entail, a big 
disadvantage is the process of ‘capping’ the bonus. Reaching the maximum payout 
suggests to the manager that his work for that period is ‘done’ and no rewards are 
given for higher performance. Instead, managerial effort is exerted in greater supply 
in the next year and the company may not record any higher profits in the coming 
year, as compared to the previous period. Another disadvantage of a capped bonus 
plan is the fact that poor performance only affects the current year bonus. This case 
may be problematic for a company at a point in time where managers recognize that 
they will not be able to meet the target for that period, shifting revenues to the 
following period and expenses from future years to the current year. The reason for 
this shifting lies in the fact that it costs the managers nothing to behave that way in 
this period, however for the next period it is more easy to reach the pre-specified 
targets (Jensen, 2003). It can be stated that the annual renegotiation does not tie 
executives’ wealth to the company’s sustained value. Moreover, managers always try 
to set targets that are easily reachable making it more realistic to receive a bonus.  
Typically, short-term pay packages are paid out to chief executives through cash 
awards. Normally, they are characterized as having only a one-year performance 
measurement term. Standard accounting measures of short-term compensation 
plans include an increase in net income, return on equity or return on assets. Short-
term pay plans are offered to those managers who are able to influence the short-
term performance of a company. Firms adopt this kind of compensation scheme to 
overcome incentive problems like risk-aversion or the horizon problem (Tehranian 
and Waegelein, 1984). 
 
3.1.3. Long-term compensation and options 
As companies have seen over time that annual bonus systems are focused on 
the short-term and thus do not often yield the expected result (i.e. an increase in firm 
performance), long-term incentive plans have been given generously to managers. 
These structures are planned to encourage executives to focus on firm performance 
over a longer period of time. Long-term incentives can take many forms, of which 
grants of shares are the most common in European countries (Pope and Young 
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2004). These grants are only paid out if certain performance objectives are met. Like 
annual bonuses, long-term incentives are often based on accounting numbers, where 
earnings per share (EPS)10 and total shareholder return (TSR)11 are the most 
common ones. Additionally, these measures are set relative to another standard or 
percentage. This may signify that a manager will only get pre-specified long-term 
incentives if the growth of the company’s earnings per share reaches a certain level. 
There are several basic remuneration schemes of long-term pay plans: (1) stock 
options, (2) stock appreciation rights, (3) phantom stock, (4) dividend units, (5) 
restricted stock, (6) performance packages (Tehranian and Waegelein, 1984). Short- 
and long-term remuneration plans differ by their length of measurement period. Long-
term compensation schemes are characterized by being measured by the rise of the 
share price or increase in earnings over several years. Usually, the manager is not 
paid in cash but rather by shares of stock (Tehranian and Waegelein, 1984). 
 
Stock options are the most common type of equity-based compensation and give 
the recipient the right but not the obligation to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified 
price. Both in the US and in the UK, exercise prices are typically fixed at the grant-
date share price. In the US, options are generally granted after ten years and 
independent of performance. However, in Europe and especially in the UK, including 
performance criteria with the stock option is standard practice (Jensen and Murphy, 
2004).  
Generally, the number of granted options highly increased in the 1980s and 
1990s. Pope and Young (2004) state that by 1986 nearly 100% of firms were offering 
options to their CEOs. Jensen and Murphy (2004) claim that there has been an 
explosion in grants of share options over the past three decades. However, 
especially in Europe, the distribution of share options to executive managers has 
decreased over the last decade. Some reasons for this include such a 
recommendation in the Greenbury Report and the existence of shareholder groups, 
                                            
10 Earnings per Share (EPS) are earnings returned on the initial investment amount; it is defined by profit divided 
by weighted average common shares. 
11 Total Shareholder Return (TSR) is commonly used in order to compare stocks and shares of different 
companies; it is defined by subtracting the share price at the beginning of a period from the one from the end of 
that period and adding the dividends paid and finally dividing all terms by the share price at the beginning of that 
period. 
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like the National Association of Pension Funds and the Association of British Insurers 
(Pope and Young 2004). 
 
3.1.4. Other incentives 
Other incentives to compensate executives include restricted shares as well as 
retirement plans and perquisites. Restricted shares are dependent on some 
conditions that have to be met to make the share fully transferable. When relating 
restricted shares or stocks to performance, usually a certain time has to pass by to 
be able to vest the share. Additionally, some targets (those may be financial or 
operational) may have to be achieved first to vest the shares. During the last years, 
restricted stocks have been become quite popular as a form of compensation for 
executives, especially as stock options have been subject to corporate scandals in 
the 21st century.12 Restricted stocks are also a quite common form of remuneration to 
ensure that ‘good’ managers will stay within the company, as those shares are 
binding for a certain time of period. According to Pope and Young (2004), particularly 
knowledge-based and high-technology industries make use of the availability of 
restricted stock compensation, as companies within these sectors try to retain 
knowledge, in the form of human capital, and not pass it on to other companies. 
Whilst restricted shares are more commonly known in the US, retirement plans are 
given to executives, especially in Europe.  
 
3.2. Trends in CEO compensation 
In the US, The average compensation for chief executives of firms in the S&P 
500 Index increased to $12.94 million last year (American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 2012). In the subsequent chapters, 
the development of CEO remuneration as well as the CEO-to-worker compensation 
ratio, the so-called “CEO pay ratio”, is analyzed. While the absolute numbers of 
executive pay are often debated and criticized, in recent times the ratio between chief 
executives and other employees has been of interest. In the US, it is likely that the 
                                            
12 There has been an excess of issue of stock options, especially in the US within the large S&P 500 firms (e.g. 
the Enron Scandal in 2001). 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will adopt rules requiring companies to 
disclose CEO-to-worker compensation (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). 
At present, the level of remuneration in European countries is below that in the 
US. However, the gap has become smaller in recent years, as executive 
compensation in Europe has increased rapidly since the beginning of the 21st 
century. In addition, the difference between European compensation and pay levels 
in the US lies in the variable element of executive remuneration, which is typically 
larger in the US (Oxelheim et al., 2010). 
Today, cash compensation makes up typically less than half of the total amount 
of executive remuneration, not more than 40 percent. This refers mainly to salary and 
granted bonuses. The same percentage can be found for equity compensation, i.e. 
restricted shares and options. Other compensation features such as pensions 
represent a much smaller fraction of CEO pay (Balsam and Yin, 2012). 
3.2.1. Absolute CEO remuneration figures 
Since the 1990s, executive pay has grown steadily and beyond the rise that could 
be explained by changes in performance or company size.13 If the ratio of 
compensation to performance or company size stayed at the same level in 2003 as it 
was in 1993, remuneration levels of chief executives would have been halved. The 
last years have been marked with a huge increase in equity-based compensation, 
even though there has not been a reduction in non-equity remuneration (Bebchuk 
and Grinstein, 2005). 
The average level of top executives’ compensation in the US rose by 13.9% in 
2011, following an even higher percentage of 22.8% in 2010 (in the S&P 500 Index). 
The S&P 500 Index, however, did not increase last year, suggesting that top 
executives are the main beneficiaries (American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), 2012).14  
In 2010, the first year of economic recovery from the global financial crisis, the 
richest 1% made up 93% of the overall growth in income in the US. The top 1% saw 
their incomes rise by 11.6%, in contrast to the bottom 99%, who grew only by 0.2%. 
                                            
13 The development of the CEO and top-five executives’ compensation figures can be found in the Appendix – 
Figure II. 
14 See Appendix – Figure III for the composition of an average CEO compensation in 2011 (in the US). 
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As a consequence, public demonstrations against inequality appeared. National 
Accounts statistics analyze that firms’ profits and issued dividends denote a strong 
growth in 2011, whereas salary and wage figures remain at a modest level (Saez, 
2012). 
3.2.2. CEO-to-worker compensation ratio 
Executive compensation increased steadily over the last two decades. Even 
when the global financial crisis started to affect companies’ practices worldwide, CEO 
pay continued to rise (Liu, 2012). In 2005, an average US top executive’s salary was 
higher for one day than an average worker’s salary in one year. The past handful of 
decades have been prosperous times for American CEOs, especially when 
comparing them to wages of workers (Economic Policy Institute, 2011). 
In 1965, the CEO-to-worker-pay-ratio was 24, rising to 35 in 1978 and 71 in 1989. 
In 2000, the CEO’s salary to worker pay ration reached a peak level of 300 (The 
State of Working America, Economic Policy Institute). Afterwards, the decline of the 
stock market caused a decline in stock-relative compensation and a moderation of 
the CEO-to-worker-pay-ratio (it fell down to a level of 131). However, top executive 
compensation rose again to reach a ratio of 277, until the global financial crisis 
caused a decline once again (Economic Policy Institute, 2006).15 
3.2.3. Remuneration differences between US, UK and Australia 
Policymakers around the world are trying to find an appropriate answer to the 
issue of executive compensation in the light of the financial crisis. There are many 
factors that influence the design process of remuneration plans: company-specific 
features as well as cultural differences and societal attitude towards executive 
compensation across the world. Typically, public outrage over excessive 
remuneration and the rise in CEO-to-average-worker pay ratio is found within 
companies in the US. Although the disparity in growth of that ratio is less pronounced 
in Australia, there has still been an increase of executive compensation packages. 
One reason for the escalation is the fact that Australian firms compete even more 
with companies worldwide in recent years. Therefore, the level of executive 
compensation has been adjusted too. In the UK, executive pay has quadrupled in 
                                            
15 The development of the CEO-to-average-worker remuneration ratio of 1965-2009 is illustrated in Appendix – 
Figure IV. 
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just one decade. Traditionally, US executive compensation has been much higher 
than its counterpart in the UK. However, in recent years the gap between the 
remuneration levels in these two countries is decreased (Hill, 2011). 
 
3.3. Performance-based compensation 
Throughout the 1980s, the so-called “leverage buy-outs” (LBOs) became 
common for many publicly traded firms. Corporate raiders claimed that the weak link 
between chief executives compensation and company performance was one the 
main reasons that companies were not maximizing economic value for shareholders. 
They accused the conventional boards of these firms for being ineffective in 
compensating their managers. After privatizing these companies, the LBO fund 
managers took some effective measures motivating CEOs to focus on the maximum 
economic value of their companies. By noticing the success of these LBOs, investors 
demanded changes to executive compensation. They insisted on pay packages 
which would motivate managers to focus on maximising shareholder value. These 
circumstances led to a huge increase of option-based compensation plans, put in 
place by corporate boards. By 1994, those stock options constituted the main 
component of executive remuneration (Institute for Governance of Private and Public 
Organizations, 2010).16  
Evidence in the related literature shows that performance-based remuneration 
packages are granted to attract and retain the best executives in a competitive labor 
market. Generally, performance-based pay plans tend to be used at smaller 
companies and new economy firms (Oyer and Schaefer, 2004). 
 
Benefits from performance-based compensation 
Stock options are issued to executives for several reasons. In what follows, I 
analyze three potential benefits of the issuing of stock options: incentive alignment 
between managers and shareholders, inducing executives to sort and managers’ 
retention (Oyer and Schaefer, 2004). 
 
• Incentive alignment between managers and shareholders 
                                            
16 See Appendix – Figure V for the rise of stock options in CEO remuneration. 
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By linking an executive’s compensation to the value of the company, some 
agency problems might be solved. Thereby the manager is motivated to carry out 
those actions, which are in the best interest of the company’s shareholders (Oyer 
and Schaefer, 2004). The associated literature suggests that companies’ stock prices 
react positively to the implementation of performance-based remuneration packages 
for executives. It should create a link between the interests of shareholders and 
management. However, it is not clear whether the company’s positive stock price 
performance at the time of the bonus plan adoption is due to the incentive plan or 
due to other events surrounding the adoption (Tehranian and Waegelein, 1984). An 
alternative view is that higher stock prices lead to the creation of incentive plans. The 
possible adoption of a bonus plans correlates with the expected future growth of 
stock prices if managers have inside information about the company’s future 
performance and thereby hope to benefit from remuneration plans aligning pay and 
performance (Pfeiffer and Shields, 2012, Warner, 1985).  
 
• Sorting effects of executives  
Performance-based remuneration may not always be granted for incentive 
reasons and therefore may not act as a motivational tool. In fact, it can be used to 
effectively screen executives within a company (Lazear, 2004). Therefore, in addition 
to providing incentives to managers, stock options are granted for reasons of sorting 
(Oyer and Schaefer, 2012). This means that “…the expectation of higher stock prices 
lead the firm to hire and retain managers who prefer performance based 
compensation” (Pfeiffer and Shields, 2012). 
 
• Manager’s retention 
 Stock-based compensation is one tool for retaining executives. It is costly for a 
manager to leave the company if he is granted with any form of performance-based 
compensation. Companies are more likely to grant options if their returns are more 
aligned with other companies within the industry that could possibly hire their 
executives (Oyer and Schaefer, 2004). Moreover, firms adopt stock-based 
remuneration when facing problems of internal finance. In times of capital 
requirements or financing limitations, stock-option plans are granted (Core and Guay, 
2001).  
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Drawbacks of performance-based compensation 
One drawback of performance-based compensation is the associated 
requirement for managers to bear risk. Firms and governmental regulators tend to 
focus on this. Moreover, performance-based compensation packages are typically 
measured only over the short term. Therefore, the G20 (Group of Twenty) reacted in 
2009 by requiring companies within the banking industry to impose bonus schemes 
that measure the performance over the medium term, i.e. for at least three years. 
The necessity to evaluate how performance is built and the further need to create 
bonus plans that incorporate this measure is crucial not only for the banking sector, 
but for all industry sectors. In addition, international banks are currently in favor of 
designing new compensation plans for more effective, time-consistent monitoring, as 
existing stock options and bonus plans are typically measured at a specific moment 
for the construction of a given performance indicator (Bernard and Courtois, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the related literature proves that using a multi-period measurement 
period for a company’s performance does not ultimately solve the crucial problem of 
excessive bonuses. In Germany, a country with sharp regulations on executive 
compensation, new law on executive pay rewards only sustainable management 
efforts. Companies are required to measure their performance with multi-year 
periods. However, by adopting this new measurement, financial literature claims that 
only yearly ups and downs are balanced. In this connection, the core issue of 
excessive pay is not addressed (Stern, 2010). 
In fact, two phenomena are blamed for spiraling managerial bonuses, which have 
become the norm over the years: fixed targets for bonus packages and wage 
benchmarking. The problem with fixed targets becomes visible in times of strong 
company performance: executives, normally having outperformed the target in good 
times, are paid large salaries. Furthermore, these high salaries are then measured 
and recommended for a benchmarking figure for future periods. One compensation 
design that overcomes these problems is indexing the company’s performance. By 
comparing the firm’s performance with that of a peer group, a more sustainable 
measurement method is found that does not drive bonus inflation (Stern, 2010). This 
is the background for how RPE contracts emerged. The next subchapter analyzes 
the use of such pay packages in theory and practice. 
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3.4. Relative performance evaluation 
Rewarding employees efficiently has always been a core subject in financial 
papers. Basing a worker’s remuneration on individual performance provides an 
incentive for him or her to be productive. However, the measured performance is 
often influenced by various factors, which are beyond the worker’s control. In fact, 
these random uncertainties have an effect on the performance of other workers, who 
participate in the same company, industry or market, too. Therefore, RPE may have 
a large impact on providing incentives to workers, while protecting them from 
common uncertainties (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). 
It is important to discuss whether risk-sharing advantages exceed the 
disadvantages. For example, when using RPE for evaluating top-level executives, 
RPE possesses several advantages. First of all, management’s remuneration 
contracts based solely on firm performance are dependent on the ups and downs of 
product and stock markets, which cannot be influenced by executive control. The 
positive effect of RPE is to insulate managers from these market shocks. 
Additionally, contracts based on RPE are often cheap to administer for top-level 
management, as the stock performance of other companies in the market is typically 
accessible at inexpensive costs. Furthermore, it is unlikely that top-management 
have interactions with executives from other companies. Sabotage and collusive 
shirking may increase costs to avoid this sort of behavior (Holmström 1982, Gibbons 
and Murphy 1990).  
A simple model of output and wages can highlight the greatest advantages of 
relative performance evaluation – reducing the risk exposure of risk-averse 
managers or workers. In the incentive model, output depends on worker’s effort, 
which is unobservable to the employer. Under full efficiency, an insurance against 
any compensation risk for the worker as well as the supply of an efficient amount of 
effort must be given. However, the best possible contract for a worker induces him to 
supply less than the efficient level of effort and therefore it may be meaningful having 
pay conditioned on a second variable (Holmström 1982, Gibbons and Murphy 
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1990)17. In alternative models, like the learning model, output depends on a worker’s 
ability, which is not always directly observable. In both models, the wage offered to 
the worker is positively related to his own output but negatively related to the average 
output of other workers. Both models find a way to filter out common shocks from a 
worker’s remuneration contract and therefore reduce the risk exposure of risk-averse 
workers in particular (Holmström 1982, Gibbons and Murphy 1990). 
 
Generally speaking, relative performance evaluation filters out a common 
uncertainty by putting a positive weight on the company’s performance and placing a 
negative weight on the performance of the peer group. Therefore, chief executives 
receive greater remuneration if shareholders of other companies in the same market 
have lower returns (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999b).  
 
In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a new 
regulation on enhanced disclosures of using relative performance evaluation in 
compensation contracts. The measurement applied to evaluate executive 
performance is regulated, as well as the extent of reliance on relative performance 
evaluation (De Angelis and Grinstein, 2011).  
 
Benefits of Relative Performance Evaluation 
The advantages for using RPE for CEOs and top-level management include the 
process of filtering out industry and market shocks from the manager’s 
compensation, easy measurement of the stock-market performance of other 
companies in the peer group and the minor potential for sabotage or other 
interactions with managers in competitive companies. Therefore, risk-averse 
executives are better off with the inclusion of RPE within their executive 
compensation contracts.  
Another possibility of filtering out common risks or shocks in the same market is 
to tie manager’s remuneration decisions on the basis of his performance to the 
performance of another executive in the same company.  
                                            
17 Gibbons and Murphy (1990) declare that the second variable has the function to provide better incentives 
without increasing the compensation risk or provide more insurance against the risk without reducing the 
incentives. 
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However, the costs of RPE might be large in this situation, as the possibility of 
sabotage or collusion is quite high and RPE might interfere with the interest of 
shareholders to maximize team production (Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1990). 
 
Drawbacks of Relative Performance Evaluation 
Despite the above-mentioned benefits, there are also disadvantages of rewarding 
managers according to relative performance evaluation, like the cost of measuring 
the average output in the market. Moreover, the size of the reference group may 
entail costs, if the cost of measuring an additional worker’s output exceeds the gain 
from including it in the average output. Besides these simple measurement costs, 
RPE can induce the worker to take actions that affect the average output of the peer 
group:  
(i) Sabotage: if a worker undertakes some actions to reduce the performance of a 
manager in the reference group. 
(ii) Collusion: a situation where workers within the same peer group work 
together. 
(iii) Choice of reference group: if a worker is involved in the evaluation process of 
choosing a specific reference group. 
(iv) Production externalities: a situation where actions of one worker may have an 
effect on the output of another manager within the same peer group, as in the case of 
team production. 
Generally speaking, if the number of workers or the reference group is quite 
small, costs due to collusion or sabotage may be higher and therefore RPE is more 
effective in the presence of a large peer group. Moreover, the administration of RPE 
for chief executives is inexpensive, as stock performances of companies in a firm’s 
peer group are steadily available at virtually no costs (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). 
 
Holmström’s (1982) theory of RPE includes the following propositions: (1) a 
manager’s contract is determined by correlated performance measures of other 
companies; (2) the average of performance measures of other companies is 
sufficient for the manager’s contract; (3) the common uncertainty (industry risk) is 
filtered out of the manager’s contract. Although theoretical articles in the financial 
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literature often provide strong support for the use of RPE in CEO compensation 
(Holmström, 1979, Holmström, 1982, Mirrless, 1976), empirical results show mixed 
results.  
The following subchapter groups papers of different arguments and tries to 
answer the question of why empirical studies do not often produce common findings.  
 
3.4.1. Related literature on relative performance evaluation 
The first tests on the use of RPE were conducted by Antle and Smith (1986), who 
analyzed a set of companies for the years running from the 1940s to the 1970s. The 
authors find mixed results, if the common uncertainty is completely filtered out of a 
manager’s compensation. By contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) analyzed over 
1,000 firms in the 1970s and 1980s and find strong support for the use of relative 
performance evaluation in executive remuneration contracts. They argue that the 
cost of measurement is quite small and the potential benefits of filtering out the 
industry risks outweigh the costs. In turn, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) find little 
support for the use of RPE for large firms in the 1990s. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, 90% of S&P 500 companies granted 
performance-based pay plans to their executives. Out of these contracts, 34% award 
their managers with evaluating their performance relative to a peer group (De Angelis 
and Grinstein, 2011). 
 
Companies using RPE  
The efficiency of a manager’s compensation contract can be improved by taking 
into account the performance of other firms in the industry, which are exposed to 
similar business risk. Efficiency increases as information about the common risk 
factor, which is disclosed by the other firms’ performance, allows the common 
business risk to be filtered out of the manager’s evaluation (Antle and Smith, 1986). 
Companies use the possibility of relative performance evaluation in CEO pay 
more, if they face less uncertainty choosing the right peer group. This can be found in 
industries with similar firm strategies or CEO skills (if executive talents are firm-
specific). For example, in high-growth industries or in smaller companies the use of 
RPE is not prevalent (De Angelis and Grinstein, 2011). 
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In general, companies use data from benchmark groups mainly for the following 
three reasons: (1) basing the awards of a firm’s performance relative to that of a peer 
group, (2) using the salary of a peer group to benchmark the CEO’s compensation 
and (3) basing the non-salary components of executive remuneration on that of a 
peer group (Bannister and Newman, 2003). 
Less than half of the firms using RPE benchmark their performance against 
industry or market-wide indexes. The rest, 61% of the companies, use a self-
designed index for benchmarking. Typically, RPE is measured over a period of three 
years. RPE is used across all industries, but is more frequently utilized in the energy 
and utility sectors (De Angelis and Grinstein, 2011).18 Other evidence shows that 
RPE is utilized in industries such as petroleum refining and paper. Within an industry 
characterized by greater monitoring and stakeholder concern about the relationship 
between pay and performance, more companies will apply RPE based compensation 
systems (Bannister and Newman 2003).  
As with many studies, there are some difficulties when comparing different 
studies of relative performance evaluation. One problem lies within the disclosure of 
RPE: some companies do not reveal how CEO pay is tied to firm performance (De 
Angelis and Grinstein, 2011).  
 
Companies not using RPE 
Even if executives are protected from several industry risks and market shocks, 
some issues still remain. The gains and losses related to stock options are 
associated only with the company’s absolute stock-market performance. Therefore, 
some components still have to be considered in addition to RPE when measuring 
executive compensation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). 
This topic is taken up by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b), who provide evidence 
that RPE can motivate managers to take actions, which minimize competitors’ 
returns. Especially if companies are strategic competitors within the same industry, 
remuneration contracts including RPE may change a managers’ optimal set of 
choices. Therefore they observe that the use of relative performance evaluation is 
lower, the higher the level of competition in an industry. 
                                            
18 Data is taken from De Angelis and Grinstein (2011). The sample consists of 494 S&P 500 firms for the year 
2007. See Appendix – Figures VI, VII and VIII for detailed graphics of the above-mentioned results. 
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Garvey and Milbourn (2003) stress that executives are able to adjust their 
investment portfolios, i.e. hedge on their own accounts, and thus remove any 
exposure to market risks by themselves. In this case, executives do not need the 
company to filter out any risks outside their control. Firms should only apply RPE 
when the company can provide less costly insurance against fluctuations (De Angelis 
and Grinstein, 2011). 
In contrast to Holmström (1982) who assumes that RPE is costless to the 
company, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) take two situations into account: (a) executive 
hedging may be costly to the manager himself due to wealth constraints and (b) RPE 
may be costly to the firm due to information-gathering, identification of the relevant 
index and the cause of unwanted executive turnover. Therefore, implications of the 
model include the fact that companies are providing less relative performance 
evaluation to a manager if the costs of hedging for executives decrease.  
Janakiraman et al. (1992) find that common uncertainty, which should be filtered 
out of executive compensation contracting according to the theory of RPE, does not 
represent any irritation or disturbance. Therefore, companies do not find it useful or 
simply find it too expensive to filter the peer-group component in estimating the 
performance of CEOs. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) identify that executive compensation responds 
significantly to luck. By filtering this form of luck, the design of RPE may not be 
optimal from an agency point of view. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) acknowledge that 
RPE can have an adverse effect on management incentives: it can distort them if 
executives have the possibility to take actions that influence the average output of 
the peer group. 
 
With these drawbacks of equity-based compensation and especially RPE in 
executive pay contracts in mind, one might question if this form of overcoming an 
agency problem is the right one. Incentive remuneration certainly entails benefits and 
encourages the manager to take actions that are in alignment with the interests of 
shareholders. However, the above-mentioned disadvantages show that one has to 
be careful when designing compensation contracts for executives. 
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4. PROPOSED SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS ON EXECUTIVE 
REMUNERATION 
4.1. The financial crisis and government bailouts 
Starting in September 2007, the global economic crisis affected financial markets 
on a level not seen since the Great Depression in the 1930s. As a direct result, 
several major financial institutions collapsed. For the general public, remuneration 
policies of financial companies are partly blamed for the economic crisis. The failure 
of risk management systems at investment banks and other financial services firms 
in the US are mentioned as primary causes of the crisis. Incentive remuneration 
structures encouraged CEOs to focus on risky short-term profits (Cluchey, 2011, 
Chang, 2011). Evidence shows that pay is indeed quite high in the banking sector, 
however the pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher 
than in any other industry prior to the crisis (Gregg et al., 2011).  
As a result of the crisis, liquidity problems and credit failures have become 
apparent (Cluchey, 2011). A number of companies needed help from the 
government: bailouts and acquisition of ownership interests have been put on the 
agenda of the government (Chang, 2011). These bailouts are carried out to prevent 
an even larger financial breakdown (Müller, 2011). At the end of 2008, the financial 
stress index reached a level five times higher than in the years before (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data, 2012).19 
Until recently, CEO compensation has been designed and controlled mainly by 
the board of directors or a dedicated remuneration committee. Over the past two 
decades, there has been an ongoing debate regarding excessive CEO compensation 
and poor alignment of pay to performance (Göx et al., 2011). The recent financial 
crisis has focused attention on highly remunerated managers in the financial services 
industry (Squam Lake Working Group, 2010). Through negative media coverage 
during the financial crisis, shareholders of large public companies have gained more 
awareness about compensation packages. The public is concerned about excessive 
payments to executives and the design of compensation packages failing to motivate 
managers to perform better (Alissa, 2009). Investors, in turn, have pushed 
                                            
19 See Appendix – Figure IX for the development of the financial stress index from 2000 to 2011. 
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governments for legislation changes to gain more control over remuneration policies. 
In recent years, policy reforms are raising the role of shareholder voice in corporate 
governance throughout the world (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
 
4.2. The demand for more regulation of executive remuneration 
Historically, there has always been a strong link between financial crisis and 
increased regulation on executive pay. After then Enron scandal in 200120, investors 
in the US waited for changes of legislation for executive compensation. However, the 
issue of manager’s pay plans has been addressed only in some provisions in the 
following Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Hill, 2011). 
As suggested by agency theory, the design of CEO compensation contracts 
should be aligned with the interest of shareholders, maximizing company profits. 
Taking this into account, executive compensation contracts often include incentive 
components that link pay more closely to performance. However, these contracts 
may be imperfect, as they do not cover all possible states of the world.  
There is an ongoing discussion whether inappropriate remuneration policies in 
financial firms should have contributed to the global financial crisis. Some people 
argue that the level of pay was too high; others blame the compensation structure. 
As a result of the global economic crisis, governments around the world are 
proposing laws to regulate the remuneration of financial executives (Squam Lake 
Working Group, 2010). The aim of those proposals is to better align remuneration 
practices with shareholders’ interests and promoting the stability of companies and 
the financial system. According to Timothy Geithner, US Secretary of the Treasury, 
five principles lead to achieve those goals, e.g. remuneration plans should properly 
measure the company’s performance and transparency is encouraged in the process 
of designing executive pay contracts (Core and Guay, 2010). 
In 2009, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established standards for 
regulating remuneration practices at companies receiving governmental financial 
assistance. Amongst others, these rules include the following: salary payments 
                                            
20 On December 2001, the energy, commodities and services company Enron filed for bankruptcy. Accounting 
practices of publicly traded companies in the US have been questioned and regulations on executive pay 
provisions followed (Hill, 2011). 
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above $500,000 are promoted to be in the form of vested stock with sales 
restrictions; bonuses are limited to one third of the total executive pay; disclosure on 
perquisites must be increased; tax gross-ups are prohibited on all kinds of 
remuneration; a compensation committee that is composed of independent directors; 
a non-binding say-on-pay vote at the shareholder annual meeting (Core and Guay, 
2010). The Shareholder Bill of Rights added with some provisions regarding the 
elimination of staggered boards, the presence of a risk team and independence of 
the CEO from the board of directors (Hill, 2011).  
From 2009 onwards, federal proposals are not only related to executive 
compensation, but also to shareholder empowerment (Hill, 2011). Of all the proposed 
issues trying to control executive pay, the model of say-on-pay has been debated in 
financial literature and public media since its adoption. Therefore I will focus on 
shareholder voting with its consequences and merits hereafter. 
Proponents of shareholder voting rights argue that say-on-pay is a value-
enhancing voting mechanism, representing an annual review and confidence vote on 
a company’s pay structure (Carter and Zamora, 2009). Moreover, the proposed 
shareholder voting legislation aims at shifting the duty of directors, designing 
executive remuneration contracts, to shareholders (Müller, 2011). By giving 
shareholders a say on executive pay, they get a right to countervail excessive 
compensation and risk-taking actions (Hill, 2011). These voting results should 
ultimately lead to changes in executives’ future remuneration.  
Many proposals have been hotly debated and have resulted in changes to 
government legislation (Alissa, 2009). The UK was the first nation to implement a 
mandatory, non-binding shareholder vote on CEO pay in 2002. This has been 
followed by the Netherlands, who required companies to cast a binding vote on 
remuneration since 2003. Two years later, the Swedish government forced 
companies to have an annual binding shareholder vote on compensation reports of 
their executive (Göx, 2012). 
In sum, 19 out of 27 European nations have established recommendations or 
legal provisions demanding companies to let shareholders have a right to vote on 
remuneration. The majority of the countries adopting shareholder votes also require a 
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binding shareholder vote (13 out of 19 nations).21 Voting patterns differ across 
countries and so do their contents. They not only concentrate on annual 
compensation reports, but also on the remuneration policy of future pay 
arrangements and actual payments to managers (Göx, 2012). As of 2011, 
government resolutions on shareholder voting have received greater interest in the 
US (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
In general, say-on-pay rules are quite similar for companies in the UK and in the 
US. However, institutional differences can have a varying impact on voting patterns 
and changes in compensation structures across firms. “There is a greater 
coordination of institutional shareholders in the UK, as members of Association of 
British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds who together own 
about one-third of listed shares, appear to act in consultation” (Balsam and Yin, 
2012). In contrast, companies (especially institutional investors) in the US often 
depend on proxy advisory firms. 
The subsequent chapters analyze possible designs of shareholder voting rights. 
Additionally, a background of proposed regulations is presented, focusing on 
shareholder rights in the UK and US. Recently proposed legislation on binding 
shareholder voting in Switzerland has attempted to reduce excessive executive 
compensation, as a result of adverse media publicity. 
4.3. Overview of shareholder voting rights 
Shareholder votes on executive pay, i.e. say-on-pay, should facilitate the 
communication between the board of directors and a company’s CEO on various 
elements of pay packages. By giving shareholders a right to vote on compensation 
issues, the board’s remuneration policy becomes independent from boards’ and 
managers’ interest (Göx, 2012). 
When looking at a company composed of shareholders, board of directors and a 
CEO, an extended version of the standard agency problem may arise, as 
shareholders delegate the design of a CEO’s pay package to the board of directors. 
                                            
21 See European Commission (2010) “Report on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 
2009/385/EC Recommendation (2009 Recommendation on directors’ remuneration) complementing 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of 
listed companies”, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm (accessed on July, 
14th, 2012).  
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This can be problematic as the nomination of board members can by influenced by 
the CEO. Therefore, a key variable is the level of board dependence. A more 
dependent board, consisting of insiders or executives from other firms in the industry, 
can offer more generous remuneration contracts to executives on the one hand, but 
increases firm value by giving more company-specific advice to executives on the 
other hand (Göx, 2012). 
Shareholders can influence the level of board dependence by approving or 
disapproving the CEO’s board nomination. Furthermore, they can influence the level 
by threatening to refuse the board’s remuneration policy. If say-on-pay is binding, 
they can force the board of directors to downsize the compensation package; if it is 
advisory, they can cast a negative vote on the proposed CEO’s compensation and in 
this way influence the board. 
On the other side, shareholders would accept a more dependent board if it 
contributes to a higher firm value (by advising the CEO). Moreover, a lower 
generosity towards the compensation of the CEO increases the willingness of 
shareholders to approve a higher level of board dependence. 
In general, there is no single policy for enforcing the one and only say-on-pay 
vote, i.e. one approach of votes that is uniformly adopted by all nations. Some 
countries require a vote on the compensation of CEOs, other cast their vote on 
directors’ remuneration (typically containing CEO pay). In addition, shareholders are 
sometimes asked to approve the compensation structure, while others are asked to 
vote on the compensation policy. The former centers on specific compensation 
elements that are granted to executives or directors, whereas the latter includes 
remuneration objectives and approaches (Larcker et al., 2012). Moreover, depending 
on the country’s legislation or the corporation’s policy, shareholder voting rights can 
differ by their enforcement nature. One can distinguish between advisory and binding 
voting rights.22  
 
4.3.1. No voting rights (voluntary votes) 
Although there have been many adoptions of mandated say-on-pay rules in 
various governments throughout the world in the last decade (starting with the UK in 
                                            
22 See Appendix – Figure X for a detailed overview of different models on say-on-pay in various countries. 
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2002), some countries still have no uniform rules on shareholder voting rights. One 
country of special interest regarding this issue is Canada. Until now, there has been 
no resolution mandated by the government that firms are required to let their 
shareholders have a voice on compensation issues in Canada. However, in February 
2009, three major banks in Canada adopted voluntarily say-on-pay rules in their 
annual general meeting: the Royal Bank of Canada, the Canadian Imperial bank of 
Commerce and the National Bank of Canada. These three companies have been the 
first banks in Canada to give their shareholders a voice on executive compensation 
(Trottier, 2011). Today, there already exists a long list of companies having 
voluntarily adopted say-on-pay proposals in their annual meeting in Canada 
(Shareholder Association for Research and Education, 2012b).23  
When comparing the effects of both advisory say-on-pay and giving shareholders 
voluntarily a right to vote on executive compensation, there are some interesting 
findings. By permitting say-on-pay votes in annual meetings, directors and executives 
are showing their trust in shareholders. Additionally, say-on-pay votes ultimately lead 
to more investments by shareholders. However, the level of trust and the willingness 
to invest resources are even greater if the voice on remuneration is given voluntarily 
to shareholders than enacted by law (Bowlin et al., 2012). 
The American computing corporation Microsoft has granted their shareholders a 
voluntary vote on executive remuneration every three years, starting in 2009, before 
the Dodd-Frank Act was released (Bowlin et al., 2012). The company declared that 
shareholders’ votes are important for transparent policies enhancing investor trust in 
companies like Microsoft. They believe that a three-year cycle of say-on-pay votes 
gives shareholders enough time to analyze short-term and long-term remuneration 
packages granted to executives and helps directors to respond thoroughly on the 
shareholders’ advises.24 
 
                                            
23 “It is intended to form an important part of the dialogue between companies and their shareholders about 
performance targets and salaries for corporate executives. …SHARE advocates for the adoption of a say-on-pay 
by all Canadian companies” (Shareholder Association for Research and Education, 2012a). 
24 See Microsoft Corporation, “Microsoft’s Board Adopts New “Say-on-Pay” Policy” (B. Smith and J. Seethoff, 
September 17, 2009), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2009/09/18/microsoft-s-board-
adopts-new-say-on-pay-policy.aspx (accessed on July 16th, 2012). 
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4.3.2. Advisory (non-binding) voting rights 
With an advisory say-on-pay voting right, shareholders attain higher firm value by 
requesting the board of directors to reduce CEO pay. The board will follow their 
advice, as they experience potential disutility from a negative voting outcome (e.g. 
negative press, lawsuits). Therefore, they accept a higher level of board dependence, 
which in return raises the CEO’s compensation and his effort level. This scenario 
however only occurs if shareholders and the board of directors have social 
preferences. This means that shareholders may have preferences for particular 
executive compensation schemes, regardless of whether the applied remuneration 
package changes their personal utility or not (Göx, 2012). 
 From an economic point of view, giving shareholders no voting rights on 
executive compensation has the same impact as providing them with an advisory 
voting right. In both cases, the investors of a company have no right to restrict 
payment packages to CEOs. Under an advisory voting regulation, the manager 
chooses the project which is in alignment with the company’s goals, but he extracts 
the highest output he can get (a maximum possible bonus). This type of regulation 
does not have a significant impact on either executive compensation or firm profit 
and it is ineffective in preventing excessive CEO pay (Göx et al., 2011). 
Advisory say-on-pay is the most common form of governmental regulations of 
shareholder voting rights on executive performance. The two most prominent 
countries that adopted this kind of regime are UK in 2002 and US in 2010. 
 
4.3.3. Binding voting rights 
When shareholders’ voting rights are binding, a given board of directors has to 
accept the voting outcome afterwards and reduce pay packages of CEO in the case 
of voter disapproval. Therefore, shareholders can effectively prevent the CEO’s pay 
package from undesirable remuneration components. Binding shareholder voting 
rights can be further classified according to the timing and the conditions of the say-
on-pay vote. Regarding the timing, there is a common split between pre-contractual 
votes and post-contractual votes. When taking the conditions of the say-on-pay vote 
into account, it can be distinguished between unconditionally binding and 
conditionally binding votes (Göx et al., 2011). 
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Pre-contractual vs. post-contractual voting rights 
A pre-contractual say-on-pay regulation has been established in the Netherlands 
in 2003 and in Sweden in 2005, submitting the executive pay contract to the 
shareholder meeting for approval before the compensation agreement is drawn and 
signed. After the voting outcome, the board of directors decides on potential revisions 
to the compensation contract (Göx, 2012).  
Taking a binding say-on-pay into account, the level of board dependence and the 
remuneration paid to the CEO is controlled by shareholders. Binding votes can be 
distinguished between pre-contractual and post-contractual proposals, i.e. if it takes 
place before or after the CEO’s compensation contract is set. A pre-contractual 
binding say-on-pay voting right influences the CEO to propose a less dependent 
board of directors, which will in turn set a lower remuneration for the CEO. The 
shareholders’ utility increases, leading to the highest level shareholder value of all 
versions of say-on-pay (Göx, 2012). 
On the other hand, having a say-on-pay vote after setting up the contract for the 
CEO, shareholders have an incentive to reject all pay elements of the CEO subject to 
a shareholder approval. A CEO foresees this and cuts his own effort level, leading to 
a lower level of CEO’s compensation and firm value than for all other designs of say-
on-pay. When considering post-contractual voting rights, the board of directors 
designs the remuneration contract of the CEO before the shareholders have their say 
on executive compensation. During the say-on-pay vote, shareholders can express 
their dissatisfaction and impose a pay cut. This regime of say-on-pay can be found in 
the law proposal incorporated in the ongoing initiative proposed by Thomas Minder, 
in Switzerland (Göx, 2012). 
 
Conditionally vs. unconditionally binding voting rights 
Another method of classifying binding votes is to look at potential project 
outcomes. Under unconditional binding voting rights, shareholders vote on executive 
compensation independent of the firm’s or project’s performance. As a result, 
shareholders are able to take a larger share of realized returns of a risky project and 
therefore have an incentive to reject a proposal on CEO’s executive compensation ex 
post. However, this discourages an executive and it is likely that he anticipates 
shareholders’ reactions. Therefore, he prefers to choose a riskless project. 
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Shareholders and managers are captured in a prisoners’ dilemma, which is 
decreasing CEO pay and firm profit. Unconditional shareholder voting rights prevents 
the selection of the right goals and thus reduces both investment incentives of 
executives and firm profit (Göx et al., 2011). 
Introducing conditional binding voting rights can impede this kind of dilemma, 
assuring that the expected bonus for the executive remains sufficiently large. Under 
this kind of regime, shareholders are only able to vote in case of a failure of the firm’s 
or project’s performance. In cases of success, shareholders are given no vote at all. 
Like advisory say-on-pay, this method does not have a large impact on CEO pay and 
firm profit; however, one can avoid any distortion of executives’ investment 
incentives. The big benefit of conditional binding shareholder votes is the efficiency it 
entails when reducing excessive remuneration in the case of poor firm performance 
(Göx et al., 2011). 
 
4.4. Advisory (non-binding) say-on-pay  
There are many countries, which installed advisory say-on-pay as a shareholder 
mechanism to control executive remuneration at annual meetings. The most 
interesting countries to analyze are the UK and the US, as they have been hit hard 
by the financial crisis. Moreover, public outrage about excessive compensation often 
targets remuneration practices of international companies in these two countries. As 
the UK was the first country to release a say-on-pay vote, many other countries rely 
on its experiences with shareholder voting. 
 
4.4.1. Shareholder rights in the UK 
British legislation has introduced several reports promoting transparency in 
corporate governance systems since the early 1990s. Based on the Cadbury Report 
in 1992, the Greenbury Report incorporates a framework of best practices on 
directors’ remuneration in 1995. The Hampel Report in 1998 subsequently 
encouraged shareholders to take an active part in company decision-making, such 
as approving new long-term incentive plans for managers.  
In 2002 the UK government finally imposed the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations (henceforth DRR), with the ambition to provide more transparency in 
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compensation packages to investors (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). Moreover, firms 
should profit from an improvement in accountability and a more effective linkage to 
performance, in accordance with the DRR legislation (Alissa, 2009). These 
regulations require all public companies to disclose their pay packages in annual 
accounts and give shareholders a mandatory but non-binding vote on executive 
compensation at the Annual General Meeting (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). The act 
states “No entitlement of a person to remuneration is made conditional on the 
resolution being passed by reason only of the provision made by this section” (DRR 
2002, Section 241A (8)). The UK is the first country to release a say-on-pay initiative 
(Balsam and Yin, 2012).  
 
In the UK shareholders are generally satisfied with the remuneration packages of 
their managers and vote in favor of the DRR. On average, less than ten percent of 
shareholders vote against a mandatory say-on-pay resolution. Actually, shareholder 
approval of the DRR is increasing over time. Nevertheless, shareholders are 
concerned about executive compensation and use the possibility of the say-on-pay 
vote for expressing their dissatisfaction and negative view of the board’s 
compensation practice (Alissa, 2009).  
Companies that can be characterized as having excess CEO pay show an 
increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
In the case of the British company GlaxoSmithKline, shareholders voted against the 
approval of the remuneration report in 2003. Negative publicity in the press has also 
surrounded the event as the pay package for the CEO Jean-Pierre Garnier has been 
perceived as too excessive. Shareholders have signaled their disapproval by voting 
against the package of their CEO. Although the shareholder voting results were non-
binding, the pay structure of GlaxoSmithKline’s managers changed after the vote 
(Conyon and Sadler, 2010). 
 
When comparing shareholder voting on CEO pay to voting on non-payment 
proposals, shareholders are more likely to vote against say-on-pay proposals than 
non-pay issues, like the routine election of board members or the appointment of 
auditors. Furthermore, shareholders tend to vote against other pay resolutions, such 
as short-term or long-term incentive plans and stock options, more than voting 
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against non-pay resolutions. This suggests that with their negative vote on say-on-
pay, shareholders like to signal their dissatisfaction about ongoing payment practices 
(Conyon and Sadler, 2010). 
 
Companies with higher executive remuneration tend to receive more negative 
votes in a say-on-pay resolution than firms with average CEO pay (Carter and 
Zamora, 2009, Conyon and Sadler, 2010). Dissent among shareholders does not 
necessarily result in a reduction of a manager’s future compensation (Conyon and 
Sadler, 2010, Ferri and Maber, 2012). Nevertheless, they reduce executives’ future 
pay if there is a large amount of shareholder dissent in companies with excessive 
CEO remuneration (Alissa, 2009). Another possible indicator for future compensation 
reduction is a high percentage of shareholders’ negative votes. Those companies, 
which have been reluctant in the past to change intensely, debated payments like 
generous severance contract payments show high dissent in the subsequent say-on-
pay voting. If these firms take the shareholders’ voting advice to reduce criticized 
payment schemes into account, they are rewarded with a decrease in negative 
shareholder votes at the following say-on-pay vote. However, if these firms do not 
consider the shareholders’ voting advice, they are further penalized with an even 
higher voting dissent at the next say-on-pay vote. Concluding, most companies with 
high voting dissent tend to reduce future payments to CEOs that are criticized a lot. 
Companies, who have already reacted in the past to criticized compensation 
packages, are likely to perform positive at the say-on-pay voting (Ferri and Maber, 
2012). 
Say-on-pay voting has an effect on another compensation issue, namely the 
performance based vesting condition in equity grants. These so-called “retesting 
provisions” make it possible to re-evaluate performance goals in the following years, 
if they have not been achieved during the first measurement period. These provisions 
have been criticized as a “reward for failure”. After a say-on-pay-vote, companies 
with high dissent voting tend to cut or completely remove these provisions from 
managers’ compensation packages (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
 
There is a positive relationship between negative voting outcome in a 
shareholders’ say-on-pay proposal and a weak pay-for-performance link in 
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managers’ bonus payments (Carter and Zamora, 2009). Subsequently, firms with a 
high dissent voting during a say-on-pay proposal tend to strengthen the pay-for-
performance link and thus increase the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance. 
The relationship between managerial compensation and other economic factors 
remains largely unchanged (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
The announcement of the adoption of the DRR regulation in the UK resulted in a 
positive stock price reaction, especially for those companies showing controversial 
pay practices, like granting their managers generous severance contract payments or 
retesting provisions for option grants (Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
Say-on-pay proposals with high dissent votes do not ultimately lead to an 
increase of equity fraction in a CEO’s pay package, which should align interests from 
owners to those of managers (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). It may even have an 
opposite effect: shareholders react by negative voting if there is a potential excessive 
dilution from stock based compensation. Boards respond to this voting dissent by 
curbing dilution from stock option grants (Carter and Zamora, 2009). 
High dissent voting results can even force CEOs out of their office, representing 
an extreme reduction of excess remuneration. The CEO can be fired by the board or 
be pushed out of the company, refusing to accept a decrease in his yearly payment 
package (Alissa, 2009). 
 
4.4.2. Shareholder rights in the US 
As a response to the global financial crisis starting in 2007, several programs 
have been started and various acts enabled in the US to satisfy shareholders’ 
demand for a right to vote on executives’ remuneration.  
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced a rule in 2006 
requiring companies to focus on disclosure with the objective of improving 
transparency and comparability. The pharmaceutical corporation Pfizer Inc. reacted 
to this ruling with a voluntary disclosure of the CEO’s pension package. In 
succession, two board members were required to step down after the shareholder 
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vote, in addition to the CEO stepping down as well.25 Since then, the first shareholder 
proposals on executive remuneration in US public firms have been submitted. They 
have mainly received significant shareholder support, however boards have ignored 
proposals even with positive voting outcomes at first. Negative response by 
companies centred on this topic. Home Depot’s executives responded “…an advisory 
vote would not provide the Committee with any meaningful insight into specific 
shareholder concerns regarding executive compensation that it could address when 
considering the Company’s remuneration policies. Finally, an advisory vote is 
impractical when more effective means of communicating concerns to the Committee 
are available to shareholders” (Thomas et al., 2012). 
Beginning in 2009, companies receiving federal assistance under the TARP have 
been mandated to adapt advisory shareholder votes on executive remuneration 
(Larcker et al., 2012). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act introduced this 
requirement as a response to the public outrage that federal bailout founds have 
been used in the past to remunerate executives bonuses (Thomas et al., 2012). 
Some companies who did not receive aid under the TARP, have even conducted 
voluntarily say-on-pay voting proposals (Larcker et al., 2012).  
From 2006 onwards, there have been requests for shareholder voting rights on 
compensation. The number of proposals calling for say-on-pay quickly increased 
(Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, 2010).26 
Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and Chris 
Dodd, Chairman of Senate Banking Committee, proposed the “Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (hereafter Dodd-Frank Act) in 
December 2009. In July 2010, President Obama finally signed the Dodd-Frank Act, 
representing a significant shift in the financial market legal system of the US (Chang, 
2011). Effective with January 21, 2011, most publicly traded corporations have to 
comply according to the long awaited say-on-pay rules, which are embodied in the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The act requires that companies give their shareholders the 
opportunity to vote on a non-binding basis on executive remuneration (Balsam and 
                                            
25 See CFO Magazine “Pay dirt: As the SEC shines a light on executive compensation, will companies clean up 
their acts or find new ways to hide excess?”, (D. Durfee, October 1, 2006), 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7987653 (accessed on July 13th, 2012). 
 
26 See Appendix – Figure XI for the development of numbers of requests for say-on-pay votes in the US. 
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Yin, 2012). Subsequently, shareholders should conduct a vote on the frequency of 
say-on-pay votes, at a minimum of one every three years (Liu, 2012). 
 
(i) Proxy advisory companies 
For more than a decade, the adequateness of remuneration levels for executives 
has been a widely discussed topic. Limitations to executive pay have often been 
carried out by utilizing taxes (making certain pay packages expensive) or by 
increasing disclosures (SEC revisions for reporting executive remuneration in annual 
statements). Shareholder voting on managers’ compensation represents a new 
mechanism to influence pay practices (Larcker et al., 2012).  
As stated above, in the US institutional investors hold the majority of the 
outstanding shares of publicly traded companies. These investors often rely on proxy 
advisory companies, who provide them with data, policies, guidelines and finally 
recommendations on shareholder proposals, like say-on-pay (Balsam and Yin, 2012, 
Larcker et al, 2012). Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. 
(GL) are the two dominant players in the market for proxy advisory services (Ertimur 
et al., 2012). 
ISS evaluates five features of executive compensation: pay for performance 
evaluation, non-performance-based pay components, peer group benchmarking, 
severance arrangements and finally compensation committee communication and 
effectiveness. Evaluating them with high, medium or low levels of concern, the 
following issues can result in a negative recommendation on say-on-pay: 
misalignment between executive compensation and performance, poor 
communication and responsiveness to shareholders and problematic pay practices 
(Larcker et al, 2012). Companies showing high concern ratings in one or more key 
features do in general receive an “against”-recommendation (Ertimur et al., 2012).  
On the contrary, GL uses three categories for their analysis: pay for performance, 
structure and disclosure. Assigning them with ratings (structure and disclosure) and 
grades (pay-for-performance), the following key pay elements get the poorest figures: 
a lack of clawback provisions, limited performance-based incentive plans, tax gross-
ups, controversial features in severance plans and lack of ownership requirements. 
In general, companies with the same grade or rating on one pay feature do not 
necessarily receive the same recommendation from the proxy advisory firm. 
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Moreover, firms with high concern rating in one key element do not automatically 
receive an “against”-recommendation (Ertimur et al., 2012). 
 There is a steadily growing use of proxy advisory companies by institutional 
shareholders as assessments of executive pay practices across all companies in 
their portfolio can be costly and complex. However, an ongoing wave of criticism is 
taking place in the proxy advisory industry, as the duopoly structure (ISS and GL are 
the primary players in that sector) may leave advisory companies lacking the 
incentive to invest in costly research.  
If recommendations from advisory companies find poor practices within the 
company in question, a change of executive compensation may increase shareholder 
value. However, if recommendations from advisory companies are inappropriate, it is 
possible that an adaption of executive pay encouraged by say-on-pay votes may not 
increase shareholder value. Alternatively, negative market reactions to the 
announcement of a change in pay packages might arise due to the fact that 
compensation changes signal poor performance in the future (Larcker et al., 2012). 
 In accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, companies are required to conduct a 
non-binding shareholder vote with shareholder meetings on or after January 21st, 
2011. Interestingly, there has been a radical boost in the moving of shareholder 
meeting dates to a time before January 21st 2011. The concentration of meetings 
before that crucial day suggests that firms tried to avoid being subject to a say-on-
pay vote for that year (Larcker et al., 2012). 
 
 As shareholders rely in part or even in whole on the recommendation of proxy 
advisory firms, it is possible for firms to decrease negative voting outcomes by 
obtaining a positive recommendation from these advisory firms. Companies can 
achieve this by changing their pay packages a priori aiming for a closer alignment 
with the guidelines of advisory companies and sticking to particular compensation 
features for a more favorable voting outcome (exclusion of tax gross-ups and 
increase of performance-based pay packages). This is traditionally done before the 
release of the proxy advisory recommendation. Results from a survey show that over 
70% of pay packages have been influences by guidelines and policies of proxy 
advisory companies (Larcker et al., 2012). 
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 Key compensation features causing negative recommendation by proxy 
advisory firms are often changed to get a more positive voting outcome. After the 
change of their remuneration programs, they subsequently received a positive 
recommendation (Lublin, 2011). The infrastructure, finance and media company 
General Electric and the mass media company Walt Disney both changed their 
remuneration packages after filing their proxy statements to get a more positive 
shareholder’s say-on-pay proposal. General Electric Company imposed stricter 
conditions and measurements for the stock option grants of CEO Jeff Immelt, while 
The Walt Disney Company eliminated tax gross-up from compensation agreements 
of four top executives. ISS adapted their recommendation for both companies on the 
date the compensation change was announced by the companies (Larcker et al., 
2012). 27 
 
(ii) Voting pattern and future executive remuneration 
In general, most companies and their CEO’s pay packages have received 
support by the majority of shareholders voting on executive remuneration. However, 
there are some discrepancies towards the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 60% of the 
firms recommended conducting a say-on-pay vote only every three years, whereas 
90% of shareholders of these companies vote for an annual say-on-pay vote. 
Companies react to shareholder recommendations, as the current increase of 
companies’ preferences show: the preferred frequency of voting on executive 
compensation every three years by 60% of all analyzed companies has changed to a 
preferred vote every year by 63% of these firms (Liu, 2012).28 
 
 Some US companies made changes to executive compensation before the say-
on-pay vote, thereby looking for a subsequent shareholder approval (Balsam and 
Yin, 2012). Several firms reduced the amount of cash compensation (salary and 
bonus) for their executives prior to a say-on-pay vote (Liu, 2012). A decrease in 
                                            
27 See also The Wall Street Journal, “Strings attached to Options Grant for GE’s Immelt”, (A. Dowell, J. S. Lublin, 
April 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703789104576272701168635450.html 
(accessed on July 18th, 2012). 
 
28 See Appendix – Figure XII for the recommendation by the company and subsequent shareholder vote on the 
frequency of say-on-pay proposals. 
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compensation was higher for companies who overpaid their CEO or top executives in 
the last year(s). Typically, the larger the downward modification, the less likely 
shareholders cast their vote against CEO pay. There has been a shift of the 
compensation mix for CEOs. Especially, an increase of performance-based 
remuneration can be found. This is consistent with larger firms and companies with 
well-paid executives (Balsam and Yin, 2012). 
 
There are some interesting findings on say-on-pay voting pattern of companies in 
the US. Firms decreasing their compensation package in advance of the vote get 
usually a higher voting approval. Vice versa, a high total compensation or a high 
increase in pay from the previous year tends to be opposed by shareholders. 
Additionally, shareholders cast their vote against executive compensation if it cannot 
be explained by economic factors. Moreover, perquisites (such as country club or 
private jets) in a CEO’s pay package often result in negative voting outcomes. The 
retention of tax gross-ups, an often-criticized feature of CEO compensation, leads 
shareholders to cast their votes against compensation packages too (Balsam and 
Yin, 2012).  
Surprisingly, some evidence shows that low shareholder support or rejection in a 
say-on-pay vote does not necessarily have the desired effect of reducing excess 
remuneration and leading to changes in the composition of future executive 
compensation (Armstrong et al., 2012).  
Interestingly, the pay component ‘salary’ is associated positively with voting 
outcomes. An increase in fixed and non-performance based elements of pay 
packages are generally viewed favorably by shareholders. This can be explained by 
the fact that the paid salaries do not incorporate incentives to take risks (Balsam and 
Yin, 2012).  
Strong firm performance is mostly rewarded with more votes in favor of the 
shareholders. The same is true for shareholder power, i.e. concentration of 
institutional shareholders, which is also seen favorable by them. Too much CEO 
power is typically associated with more votes against executive compensation 
(Balsam and Yin, 2012). 
 
(iii) US banking sector 
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One say-on-pay disapproval vote caused quite a stir throughout the media 
worldwide: the shareholders’ rejection of a CEO’s compensation package for the first 
time in the banking sector. This happened at the annual meeting of Citibank, the 
third-largest bank in the US. Shareholders have rejected the pay package of CEO 
Vikram Pandit in April this year, which has already been approved by the company’s 
board. They casted their votes against the compensation plan of paying the CEO $15 
millions as remuneration for a year when the company’s shares fell by 44%. 55% of 
all shareholders voted against the bank’s payout plan. These 55% include also 
absentee votes, which are counted as rejections by US law. Since US say-on-pay 
votes are non-binding, the company can take the shareholders’ advice but is not 
forced to change its practices. However, according to the bank’s chairman Richard 
Parsons, Citigroup will define a more formula-based method for designing the pay 
package of top executives. In advance of the say-on-pay votes, both proxy advisory 
firms, ISS and GL have expressed their disapproval of the Vikram Pandit’s incentive 
pay and retention programs, both lacking the necessary incentives to achieve the 
goal of improving shareholder value as well as the absence of a connection between 
pay and performance.29 
The disapproval of shareholder voting at Citigroup can have an impact of future 
say-on-pay votes at larger and smaller banks in the US. However, one month after 
Citigroup’s shareholder vote, the compensation plans for top executives at the two 
other large banks in the US, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America, have 
been approved in the required say-on-pay vote.30  
 
4.5. Binding say-on-pay 
Shareholder voting rights, which are binding to a company’s directors and 
executives, have been put on the agenda of legislation of various countries, e.g. 
                                            
29 See The Guardian, “Citigroup shareholders reject CEO Vikram Pandit’s pay package” (D. Rushe, April 17, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/apr/17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-ceo-pay (accessed on July 
14th, 2012). 
30 For more information, see also The Wall Street Journal, “Regional Banks Feeling Citi Pay Pain” (R. Sidel, S. 
Kapner and J. S. Lublin, April 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304331204577352280113526076.html (accessed on July 16th, 
2012). 
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Netherlands and Sweden. In Switzerland, one initiative aiming for more shareholder 
rights regarding executive compensation at all publicly trading Swiss companies 
concerns the whole country. In the subsequent chapter, the background and the 
successive consequences of this initiative are analyzed. 
4.5.1. Shareholder rights in Switzerland  
At present, there is a public debate over managers and directors of companies 
that pay themselves a lot of compensation (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005). Public 
outrage leads to discussions about CEO remuneration in the media. This again 
induced regulatory activities such as the upcoming Swiss initiative “against rip-off 
salaries” – “gegen die Abzockerei” (Müller, 2011). 
In Switzerland, the public can enact new laws by carrying out an initiative, which 
can be started by every Swiss citizen. If this initiative has been signed by at least 
100,000 citizens, it must be put on the agenda for a Swiss national vote. In the event 
of a positive outcome for the initiative in the popular vote, it will turn into an 
amendment to the Swiss constitution (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). 
The Swiss Federal popular initiative “against rip-off salaries” reached the required 
signatures within 18 months and was submitted to the Federal Chancellery on 
February 26, 2008. A single man, the Swiss entrepreneur Thomas Minder, launched 
the law proposal, which contains a clear program aiming for more transparency in 
pay structures of Swiss firms (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). 
The initiative demands that shareholders of all listed companies in Switzerland 
are required to cast a binding vote on the total remuneration of executive managers 
and board of directors on an annual basis. This initiative includes a total of 24 
requirements, of which the most important are the following: shareholders have the 
right to vote ex ante on the amount of the pay package, proposed by the firm’s board, 
whereas executive compensation in excess of the approved pay package has to be 
put on a voting agenda ex post. The board of directors has to ensure that the 
shareholders support their proposed pay packages, as in case of a denial they have 
to organize a new assembly, which would not raise the firm’s reputation. Moreover, 
termination pays, advance payments and bonuses in the event of company sales are 
not allowed any more. A vote of the general assembly is also needed if performance-
related payments to executives or directors should be modified. The government of 
Switzerland designed an alternative draft (“Obligationenrecht - Vergütungen bei 
  
46  
börsenkotierten Gesellschaften sowie weitere Änderungen im Aktienrecht”) to the 
initiative “gegen die Abzockerei”. However, according to the committee of the 
initiative, only five out of total 24 requirements have been met. 12 requests have 
been avoided, thus not fulfilled. Five requirements have been ignored at all. 
Therefore, the national vote should be either on November 25th, 2012 or March 3rd, 
2013.31 
The committee of the initiative shows that the total remuneration of board of 
directors and management has risen by 87% from 2002 to 2006 within companies in 
the Swiss Market Index. This initiative in Swiss should strengthen shareholder power 
within a company more than other say-on-pay laws in other countries, as the vote on 
executive and board remuneration is binding to the company (Wagner and Wenk, 
2012). 
 
Wagner and Wenk (2012) analyze the stock market reactions to the 
announcement in February 2008 of the law proposal. The initiative, aiming at 
enforcing a popular vote, was not predictable and came quite quickly, compared to 
standard votes, where the date of the vote is usually known in advance. Additionally, 
the Swiss stock exchange represents one of the largest stock exchanges worldwide 
in terms of market capitalization. Therefore, information on stock market reactions 
can be extracted easily and efficiently. 
In general, larger firms are less affected by the announcement of the initiative 
than smaller corporations. The former are better prepared, whereas the latter face 
higher costs adjusting to the new law. Companies with highly concentrated or highly 
dispersed ownership are better positioned in case of legislation change (Wagner and 
Wenk, 2012). 
Companies showing a high performance in the past revealed high stock price 
drops, whereas firms with poor performance reacted more positively. Moreover, 
companies with CEOs having excess remuneration do not show any big changes in 
stock prices, whereas firms paying their executive “normal” salary tended to 
decrease most. Therefore, there are more positive reactions to a potential binding 
                                            
31 Eidgenössiche Volksinitiative “gegen die Abzockerei” (2012), http://www.abzockerei.ch (accessed on July, 4th 
2012). 
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say-on-pay for companies with current poor alignment between shareholders and 
executives (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). 
Additionally, stock price declines can be found in the following three cases: (1) 
firms using only cash-based compensation programs for remunerating their 
executives, (2) firms with younger CEOs or CEOs with short–time employment and 
(3) shareholders with higher uncertainty regarding their annual costs or sales. Unlike 
equity-based remuneration, cash bonuses would require an ex-post shareholder 
vote. This can lead to biased ex-ante incentives for CEOs (like for equity-based pay 
packages). Older Executives or with higher seniority are often more willing to make 
firm-specific investments; whereas their younger colleagues prefer to exercise their 
outside options. Moreover, it is more difficult for shareholders with higher uncertainty 
to better align with executives due to the fact that more eventualities have be allowed 
for (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). 
In general, shareholders acknowledge that say-on-pay has benefits for them, but 
they know that it entails some costs too. If these costs are higher then the expected 
benefits, they react more negatively leading to a decrease in stock prices. Moreover, 
it is not in the best interest of shareholders to extend their power. They are better off 
giving control to their board of directors and motivating executives to make more firm-
specific investments and avoid exercising outside options. This is usually the case 
within an advisory say-on-pay setting, where shareholders’ votes stand solely for a 
hint to executives. Through a binding say-on-pay, shareholder power is enhanced 
and can hence solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders. 
However, as stated above, it highlights the hold-up problem too, i.e. executives may 
be reluctant exercising firm-specific investments (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). 
The question remains if a binding say-on-pay vote is the best approach for 
companies and its shareholders. An advisory vote has two crucial impacts: (1) 
shareholders can still give their individual feedback to companies and (2) boards of 
directors can act flexible in matters regarding executive remuneration (Müller, 2011). 
 
4.6. Potential drawbacks of say-on-pay  
Of all the presented models of say-on-pay, there does not exist a “right model” for 
regulating executives’ and directors’ compensation and thus overcoming 
remuneration problems. Additionally, different models vary according to the efficiency 
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of treating different pay problems. For example, there might exist a different 
mechanism for resolving a potential misalignment between pay and performance 
than for limiting excessive payments to CEOs (Larcker et al., 2012). 
Giving shareholders a right to vote on compensation contracts is not always the 
first-best choice. Intensive pressure from the public can encourage firms or even 
governments to adopt regulatory provisions without taking account of companies’ pay 
structures and all the consequences the measures entail (Göx et al., 2011). Negative 
shareholder voting outcomes, i.e. a say-on-pay voting failure, might even impose 
substantial costs to shareholders. Apart from negative press and public outrage, 
failing to obtain support for say-on-pay proposals can lead to regulatory revisions or 
distraction of executives and employees. Additionally, companies and board 
members can be involved in a derivative lawsuit. In 2011, seven companies in the 
US were sued shortly after the announcement of a say-on-pay voting failure (Larcker 
et al, 2012). 
Policymakers around the world should be careful when regulating the level of 
executive remuneration. Limiting executive compensation can bear the risk that 
highly talented employees might not find the most productive occupation, which will 
slow the economic growth. Limits on the level of remuneration in the financial 
services industry involve the risk of loosing professionals to companies in 
unregulated sectors or even to firms in other countries, which do not have that 
intensity of regulation (Squam Lake Working Group, 2010). 
When conducting an annual say-on-pay vote, boards sometimes do not have the 
time for redesigning compensation plans in an efficient way. The short interval 
between the yearly votes may limit the impact shareholders are expecting after 
providing their consultation to the company. Moreover, shareholder votes conducted 
every two or three years have the advantage of being more in alignment with multi-
year compensation features. Therefore, policymakers should be careful when 
adopting a mandatory annual say-on-pay vote. Additionally, it might be challenging 
enough for shareholders to gather the necessary information on compensation 
issues every two or three years. 
Generally, the primary purpose of say-on-pay is not to establish a direct 
shareholder control over executive remuneration plans. It rather permits shareholders 
to influence a board’s perspective and react to compensation decisions. Say-on-pay 
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may encourage shareholders to micromanage companies, despite having a weak 
understanding of pay structures and incentive systems for executives. If executives 
anticipate the potential risk of not receiving the total compensation they are 
expecting, say-on-pay can minimize their effort. At the worst, shareholders can even 
refuse well-designed executive compensation packages. There is also some 
evidence that shareholders sometimes reject compensation proposals whenever they 
have the right to vote in this manner, independent of the voting right applied. 
However, in most cases poor performance is the trigger for negative voting outcomes 
(Göx et al., 2011). 
The crucial question is if a shareholder say-on-pay voting right is a valuable 
corporate governance tool. It might be case if excessive executive compensation is a 
hotly debated issue within companies. However, boards of directors or compensation 
committees are installed for designing the compensation contract for executives. 
Shareholders shift this responsibility to directors, as compensation decisions are 
often time-consuming and complex (Core and Guay, 2010). They are dependent on 
various factors, including the competitive situation and the company’s strategies, as 
well as the firm’s culture and the aim to have a short- or long-term focus.  
For outsiders, like big institutional investors, it is not always easy to determine if a 
specific remuneration plan was appropriate or not. Boards of directors or 
compensation committees often have company-specific inside information and 
should be experts in setting pay levels for their executives (Core and Guay, 2010). 
When designing an executive’s pay contract, one has to bear in mind the 
environment surrounding the company: are there any outside factors that influence a 
company’s strategy? How does a firm’s risk profile influence a manager’s 
compensation plan? Moreover, shareholders’ say-on-pay votes are a signal to 
boards of directors and executives, but it can be difficult to assess whether the voting 
outcome reflects this year’s compensation or whether shareholder object to the 
design of a bonus promised several years ago. What remains is a variety of 
interpretations of voting outcomes and the question if this process of shareholder 
consultation is the most efficient one. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In times of public outrage on excessive CEO compensation and market pressure 
on limiting executive pay, recommendations on managerial remuneration made by 
public institutes and regulations imposed by governments are seen favorably by 
investors throughout the world. The global financial crisis has awakened 
policymakers of all nations to focus even more on limiting executive compensation by 
adopting new rules and conditions. 
The core issue of the known-to-all agency theory is to find strategies to align 
interests of managers and shareholders. Two approaches are developed for 
overcoming the so-called agency problem: monitoring or controlling the agent and 
incentive executive compensation. Generally, shareholders of large companies are 
too diffuse and uninformed to directly control management efficiently. Moreover, the 
installation of monitor systems is often costly in terms of time and money. Aware of 
the above-described problem of controlling, the second approach, managerial 
incentive compensation, seems to overcome the first approach and directly 
measures a manager’s success by linking the manager’s remuneration to a 
company’s performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Typically, equity-based compensation plans are used for incentive executive 
remuneration. However, evidence has shown that this popular form of remuneration 
shows some drawbacks, like the possibility of windfall gains: a natural increase in 
executive compensation due to the good development of a market or industry, and 
not due to the manager’s efforts. This phenomena and other drawbacks show that 
usual performance-based executive contracts are not always the best answer to 
solve agency problems (Müller, 2011).  
 
One compensation design that overcomes these problems is indexing the 
company’s performance. By comparing the firm’s performance with that of a peer 
group, a more sustainable measurement method is found that does not drive bonus 
inflation (Stern, 2010). The so-called relative performance evaluation method filters 
out common risks of all companies in the same industry from a manager’s 
compensation contract. Companies use data from benchmark groups mainly for the 
following three reasons: (1) basing the awards of a firm’s performance relative to that 
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of a peer group, (2) using the salary of a peer group to benchmark the CEO’s 
compensation and (3) basing the non-salary components of executive remuneration 
on that of a peer group (Bannister and Newman, 2003). However, there are mixed 
findings in related literature for the use of RPE in managerial incentive contracts. 
Firms find it too expensive to filter the peer-group component in estimating the 
performance of CEOs (Janakiraman et al., 1992).  
In general, executives’ compensation contracts in the US often include 
performance-based incentives, in the form of stock, options or other performance-
based remuneration. The percentage of equity incentives in executive’s 
compensation packages is much higher in the US than in any other country. 
Therefore, the push toward more performance-based incentives seems quite 
puzzling considering the fact that more equity ownership implies higher executive 
compensation. If managers are imposed with equity ownership without giving an 
increase of their remuneration, they focus on reducing the risk of their equity, like 
rejecting risky projects, if even if they are increasing shareholder wealth (Core and 
Guay, 2010). 
 
With the beginning of the financial crisis, regulations are not only focusing on 
limiting executive pay, but also on empowering shareholders. United Kingdom has 
started in 2002 with the installation of shareholder say-on-pay voting rights, followed 
by many other nations, including the United States in 2010. Different models of 
shareholder voting rights in theory and practice are presented. There does not exist 
one “right” form of say-on-pay voting rules. Every nation or corporation has to decide 
on its own which form to apply or whether to apply a voting right at all. Companies in 
Canada show that voluntary votes are sometimes a better way to show trust in 
boards of directors and specific compensation committees.  
The existing literature differs on the positive outcomes of say-on-pay votes. Say-
on-pay legislation increases shareholders’ power for reducing CEO excessive pay 
and shareholders’ control of the design of the CEO pay packages. As Conyon and 
Sadler (2010) discover, say-on-pay rules encourage shareholder activism by giving 
them more power to alter pay structures of executives and board of directors. Ferri 
and Maber (2012) reveal that advisory votes help shareholder to overcome possible 
barriers when negotiating with executives at year-end. Moreover, the relationship 
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between CEOs and shareholders is strengthened. It is a tool for pushing companies 
to eliminate controversial pay practices, like excessive payments to CEO despite 
poor performance of the company. 
On the other hand, shareholder voting appears to have limited effects on 
reducing excess executive compensation (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). In the UK, say-
on-pay resolutions are non-binding. After a negative voting outcome, the 
management can easily disregard the shareholders’ vote, unless it is binding for 
them. This occurs especially for companies with relatively low voting dissent (Carter 
and Zamora, 2009). Additionally, managers might be encouraged to indirectly 
misinform shareholders, leading to suboptimal payment plans (Ferri and Maber, 
2012). However, evidence from the financial literature points to the high dissent 
voting in say-on-pay proposals which might affect the company’s reputation and 
therefore push firms to react in accordance with the shareholder voting results 
(Alissa, 2009, Ferri and Maber, 2012). 
Although both the US and the UK have implemented say-on-pay regulations on 
publicly listed companies, there is ongoing public outrage for even more shareholder 
rights in these countries. According to the critics, the non-binding voting nature is not 
strong enough to prevent undesirable pay elements in remuneration contracts (Göx 
et al., 2011). In the US, there are requests for binding say-on-pay votes and further 
increase shareholder power. For example, the Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval 
Act, published in 2009, requires that 60% of all shareholders have to approve the 
vote on executive compensation, if a manager earns 100 times more than the 
average employee within a company (Wagner and Wenk, 2012). In the UK, the 
Prime Minister David Cameron suggested installing a say-on-pay vote that is binding 
in nature, like in other European countries, e.g. the Netherlands or Sweden. It is up to 
companies all over the world, whether changes in legislation resulting in 
modifications in executive contracts and shareholder empowerment will lead to a 
cultural shift in the future (Hill, 2011). 
 
Nowadays, companies face intense pressure to select the appropriate, most 
efficient, cost-saving and shareholder-satisfying executive compensation contracts. 
In addition, the CEO-to-average-worker pay ratio has received more attention in 
recent years, as it has risen to an exorbitant level. To put it in another way: “We need 
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to decide as a society whether this increase in income inequality is efficient and 
acceptable and, if not, what mix of institutional and tax reforms should be developed 
to counter it” (Saez, 2012).  
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6. ABSTRACTS 
6.1. Abstract – English version 
This thesis provides possible solutions to the agency problem, i.e. finding 
mechanisms for aligning interests of managers and shareholders. In times of the 
global financial crisis, the rise of executive compensation is debated all over the 
world. Actual compensation figures are presented as well as the development of 
CEO-to-average-worker ratio. Two approaches are developed for overcoming the 
agency problem: monitoring or controlling the agent and incentive executive 
compensation. As controlling the agent is often costly in terms of time and money, 
many companies focus on executive performance-based compensation, which links 
a manager’s remuneration to a company’s performance. As a very special form of 
incentive-based compensation, the model of relative performance evaluation is 
examined.  
Recent discussions do not only include regulation of executive compensation, but 
also how to empower shareholders. Say-on-pay models have mushroomed in many 
countries. The UK was the first country to release a mandatory shareholder voting at 
annual meetings of publicly traded companies. In 2010, the US followed the UK 
example with the adoption of a mandatory but non-binding say-on-pay for all large 
companies. As a very recent topic, the proposed legislation on binding shareholder 
voting in Switzerland is analyzed. Despite the enthusiasm among investors, say-on-
pay has its critics too. Negative voting outcome might impose substantial costs to 
shareholders. Efforts of executives can be minimized, if they anticipate a potential 
risk of not receiving the total compensation they are expecting. There is as higher 
risk in industries with say-on-pay regulations of loosing professionals to companies in 
unregulated sectors or even to firms in other countries, which do not have that 
intensity of regulation. 
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6.2. Abstract – German version 
Diese Diplomarbeit präsentiert potentielle Lösungen für das Prinzipal-Agenten-
Modell, d.h. bestimmte Mechanismen um die Interessen von Managern und 
Aktionären zu verbinden. In Zeiten einer globalen Finanzkrise wird der Anstieg der 
Vergütungen von Führungskräften heiß diskutiert. In diesem Licht werden 
tatsächliche Verdienstzahlen präsentiert, sowie die Entwicklung des Verhältnisses 
von Führungskraft- und Angestelltengehalt. Es werden zwei Ansätze zur Lösung des 
Prinzipal-Agenten-Problems entwickelt: Die Beobachtung oder Kontrolle des Agenten 
und das leistungsbezogene Anreizsystem. Da eine Kontrolle der Agenten im Sinne 
von Zeit und Geld meist sehr kostspielig ist, konzentrieren sich viele Firmen auf die 
leistungsbezogene Vergütung, welche die Bezahlung ihrer Geschäftsführer mit der 
Entwicklung der Geschäftszahlen verknüpft. Als eine besondere Form dieser Bonus-
basierenden Vergütung wird das Model der relativen Leistungsbewertung (engl. 
relative performance evaluation) genauer untersucht. 
Aktuelle Diskussionen beinhalten nicht nur Regulierungen der Managervergütung 
sondern auch Möglichkeiten zur Stärkung der Aktionäre. „Say-on-pay“-Modelle 
erfahren aktuell eine breite Aufmerksamkeit in vielen Ländern. Großbritannien war 
das erste Land, welches verpflichtende Aktionärsabstimmungen für börsennotierte 
Unternehmen einführte. 2010 folgte die USA dem Beispiel Großbritanniens mit der 
Einführung einer verpflichteten, aber nicht bindenden, Abstimmung für alle großen 
Unternehmen. Als sehr aktuelles Kapitel wird die vorgeschlagene Volksabstimmung 
über bindende Aktionärsabstimmungen in der Schweiz analysiert. Trotz der 
Begeisterung für „say-on-pay“-Gesetze unter den Investoren, gibt es auch Kritiker 
dieser Strategie. Negative Abstimmungen können auch beträchtliche Kosten für die 
Aktionäre beinhalten. Die Arbeitsleistung der Führungskräfte kann durch 
Befürchtungen minimiert werden, dass erwartete oder vereinbarte Vergütungen nicht 
ausbezahlt werden. Es existiert auch ein höheres Risiko für Branchen mit „say-on-
pay“-Regulierungen, hoch qualifizierte Führungskräfte an Firmen in unregulierten 
Branchen oder sogar an Firmen im Ausland zu verlieren.  
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7. APPENDIX 
7.1. Figures 
Figure I – Base salary and bonus for a typical annual bonus plan 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jensen and Murphy (2004) 
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Figure II – Increase in compensation of CEO and top-five executives 
 
 
 
Source: Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) 
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Figure III – Average CEO compensation in 2011 (in the US) 
 
 
Source: American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) (2012) 
 
 
 
Source: own illustration 
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Salary $1,091,182 
Bonus $268,110 
Stock Awards $5,279,828 
Option Awards $2,352,544 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation $2,382,529 
Pension and Deferred Compensation Earnings $1,308,625 
All Other Compensation $252,657 
TOTAL $12,935,475 
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Figure IV – CEO-to-average-worker pay ratio 1965-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The State of Working America, Economic Policy Institute (January 21, 2011)  
 
Source: The State of Working America, Economic Policy Institute (2010) 
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Figure V – The rise of stock options in CEO remuneration 
 
 
 
Source: Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (2010) 
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Figure VI – The use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in the US 
(from a sample of 494 S&P 500 firms in 2007) 
 
 
 
Source: De Angelis and Grinstein (2011) 
 
 
 
Source: data taken from De Angelis and Grinstein (2011), own illustration 
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Figure VII – Average weights of performance measures  
In the following figure, various types of performance measures associated with RPE 
are presented. 
 
 
 
Source: De Angelis and Grinstein, 2011 
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Figure VIII – Distribution of the performance horizon 
In the following figure, the distribution of the performance horizon associated with 
RPE is presented. 
 
 
 
Source: De Angelis and Grinstein, 2011  
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Figure IX – Financial Stress Index 2000 – 2011 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
(2012) 
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Figure X – Models of say-on-pay in various countries 
 
 
 
 
Source: Larcker et al., 2012 
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Figure XI – Number of requests for say-on-pay votes received in the US 
 
 
 
Source: Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations (2010) 
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Figure XII – Frequency results on say-on-pay proposals 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data taken from Liu (2012), own illustration 
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